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INTRODUCTION: 
 
Although the average U.S. consumer may be unfamiliar with the 
Jones Act1— a century old U.S. maritime cabotage law—one has most 
likely been burdened by the law’s associated costs, which are estimated to 
be $1.32 billion annually.2 The law’s blatant protectionist scheme 
continues to throttle domestic port-to-port maritime trade, and has 
inhibited the U.S. maritime industry to a point where U.S. flag-bearing 
ships can no longer compete in the international market.3 But worse, 
adverse effects of the law have now invaded other U.S. industries, notably 
choking the energy market, as the Jones Act continues to prevent effective 
transportation of new forms of natural resources being produced 
domestically.4 The Jones Act is now in dire need of reevaluation, as it no 
longer serves its intended purpose, constrains economic growth in key 
sectors of the domestic marketplace, and continues to adversely impact 
U.S. consumers.  
Formally, the Jones Act—which is named after its author, Senator 
Wesley L. Jones—is codified in Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act 
of 1920,5 and “has long been regarded as [the] cornerstone of U.S. 
maritime policy.”6 More specifically, the Jones Act is the pinnacle of the 
U.S.’s broader scheme of “cabotage regulations,” which “are not unique 
to the maritime industry,” but just refers to “coastwise [or coastal]” 
transportation of goods and merchandise.7 So, maritime cabotage 
regulations are the surrounding laws that govern domestic, port-to-port 
 
1 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2012) (formerly cited as 46 App. 
U.S.C. §§ 861–889 (2002)) (commonly referred to as “the Jones Act”). 
2 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS 122 
(2d Ed., 1999). 
3 See infra Part III.A.2. 
4 See James Coleman, Repeal the Jones Act for American Energy, REGULATORY 
TRANSPARENCY PROJECT 1, 3 (Sep. 28, 2017), https://regproject.org/paper/repeal-jones-act-american-
energy/. 
5 Note that Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which “governs claims made 
by seaman for personal injuries suffered in the course of their employment,” is also sometimes referred 
to as “the Jones Act,” but the only focus of this paper is Section 27 (as codified in 46 U.S.C. § 55102), 
which will be referred to throughout as “the Jones Act.” See Constantine G. Papavizas & Bryant E. 
Gardner, Is the Jones Act Redundant?, 21 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 95, 96–97 (2009). 
6 John F. Frittelli, The Jones Act: An Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 1 
(July 8, 2003), https://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS21566.  
7 Id. at 1–2; see also Wakil O. Oyedemi, Cabotage Regulations and the Challenges of 
Outer Continental Shelf Development in the United States, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 607, 611 (2012) 
(“cabotage regimes are laws regulating the transportation of persons and merchandise from one point 
to another along the coastal waters of a nation”). 
2019                GETTING WHAT YOU BARGAINED FOR 65 
trading in the U.S. The Jones Act operates similarly to most other countries 
maritime cabotage laws, generally aiming to (1) create a strong merchant 
marine that can quickly mobilize in times of national emergency and (2) 
“protect American sovereignty over domestic maritime commerce.”8 
Specifically, Section 1 of the statute states that: 
It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth 
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a 
merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels 
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval 
or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to 
be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it is 
declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be 
necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant 
marine, and, in so far as may not be inconsistent with the express 
provisions of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall [. . .] keep 
always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be attained.9 
 
In order to ensure that this purpose is met, the Jones Act sets forth 
stringent requirements for ships that want to operate on U.S. domestic 
port-to-port routes, requiring that: “[A]ll waterborne shipping between 
points within the United State [must] be carried by vessels built in the 
United States, [be] owned by a U.S. citizen (at least 75%), and [be] 
manned with U.S. citizen crews.”10 Thus, on a broader scale, the Jones Act 
protects the U.S. industry from foreign competitors, ultimately aiming to 
create a strong maritime industry that cannot easily be undercut. But, 
conflicting interests and changing economic landscape have brought the 
Jones Act under fire, as the Act struggles to continue serving its intended 
purpose and unintended consequences of the Act become more prevalent.  
The Jones Act’s recent return to prominence in the wake of 
Hurricane Maria provides an excellent illustration of just how outdated the 
law is, reviving heated debate amongst economic experts and lawmakers 
alike on the statute’s relevance and applicability in modern times.11 As 
“the fulcrum of the cabotage regulation in the United States [inclusive of 
the non-contiguous U.S. states and territories],”12 the Jones Act’s stringent 
domestic shipping requirements became the center-point of discussion in 
Maria’s aftermath, hindering the Trump administration’s ability to quickly 
 
8 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
9 46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (2002) (emphasis added). 
10 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 1. 
11 See Niraj Chokshi, Trump Waives Jones Act for Puerto Rico, Easing Hurricane Aid 
Shipments, N.Y. TIMES ¶ 14–15 (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/jones-act-
waived.html. 
12 Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 608. 
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respond to one of the worst natural disasters in our nation’s history.13 
Ultimately, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was forced 
to grant a waiver of the Jones Act,14 which allowed foreign ships a rare 
opportunity to enter the U.S. domestic shipping realm to provide much 
needed aid for Puerto Rico recovery efforts (albeit only for a short, 10-day 
period).15 Similarly, the Jones Act was waived during Hurricane Harvey 
for essentially identical reasons,16 as the U.S. lacked sufficient Jones Act 
compliant ships to properly supply a devastated Houston with desperately 
needed resources, such as sufficient fuel to “restore services and 
infrastructure in the wake of the storm.”17 Granting Jones Act waivers to 
foreign ships following natural disasters has in fact become common 
practice of DHS because the U.S. merchant marine, which was supposed 
to be bolstered by the Jones Act, lacks the necessary capacity and speed to 
effectively respond in emergency situations.18  
The irony of this illustration is hard to miss, as one of the stated 
purposes of the Jones Act is to have a domestic fleet of seafaring vessels 
that can offer aid and quickly respond during any “national emergency.”19 
But, the DHS’s repetitive grants of Jones Act waivers during national 
emergencies (e.g., natural disasters) perfectly exemplifies the law’s 
ineffective and antiquated nature, succinctly showing one of the many 
 
13 See Alana Abramson & Jennifer Calfas, What to Know About the Impact of the Jones 
Act on Puerto Rico Aid, TIME ¶ 1–5 (Sep. 28, 2017), http://time.com/4961159/ 
what-is-jones-act-puerto-rico/; see also Amber Phillips, Trump just lifted the Jones Act for 
Puerto Rico. Here’s what that does., WASH. POST ¶ 1–5 (Sep. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/27/all-about-the-jones-act-an-obscure-
shipping-law-thats-stalling-puerto-ricos-recovery/?utm_term=.5610a43eb561 (showing the national 
coverage on the Jones Act’s related to Hurricane Maria recovery efforts). 
14 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Waiver of Compliance with Navigation Laws, Jones 
Act Waiver (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/17_0928_AS1_Jones-Act-Waiver.pdf. 
15 See James Coleman, Repeal the Jones Act to Speed Puerto Rico Recovery, FOX NEWS ¶ 
6 (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/10/11/repeal-jones-act-to-speed-puerto-
rico-recovery.amp.html. 
16 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Waiver of Compliance with Navigation Laws, Jones 
Act Waiver (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/17_0908_AS1_Jones-Act-Waiver.pdf. 
17 U.S. waives Jones Act to secure fuel for hurricane responders, REUTERS ¶ 5 (Sept. 8, 
2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-irma-shipping/u-s-waives-jones-act-to-secure-
fuel-for-hurricane-responders-idUSKCN1BJ2GE. 
18 See Thomas Grennes, An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act, MERCATUS CENTER 3, 9 
(2017), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-grennes-jones-act-v2.pdf. 
19 46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (2002); see also Alexander Stevens, The Jones Act: Distorting 
American Energy Markets Since 1920, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. ¶ 1 (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/jones-act-distorting-american-energy-markets-since-
1920/ (“[t]he temporary suspension of the legislation [following Hurricane Maria] is noteworthy 
because one of the stated purposes of the Jones Act is to better prepare the country for natural 
disasters”). 
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reasons why the outdated law should be substantially relaxed or repealed, 
especially considering the law’s permeation into other crucial areas of the 
U.S. economy.  
This article will explore the ramifications that the Jones Act has 
on those other crucial areas of the U.S. economy, specifically looking at 
the U.S. energy market and analyzing how the Jones Act’s interplay with 
the domestic energy transportation market has been affected. Because of 
the substantial burden the Jones Act places on the shipping of natural 
resources, the U.S. energy market has been hindered, as this law continues 
to adversely impact both U.S. consumers and energy industry 
development in general. Given the U.S.’s renewed interest in development 
of an independent energy market,20 it is time to revise or repeal the overly-
restrictive measures the Jones Act has imposed on transportation of natural 
resources to help fix the outdated U.S. maritime cabotage laws and 
promote necessary growth in the U.S. energy market. 
Following this introduction, Part II will discuss the relevant 
historical background of U.S. cabotage laws and development of the Jones 
Act, considering how the domestic shipping trade developed in response 
to the stringent requirements of the law. This section will help to provide 
a better understanding of how stringent cabotage laws hinder domestic 
commerce and the transportation of natural resources. Part III will then 
discuss the current state of U.S. maritime cabotage law and the Jones Act, 
considering (1) the current economic effects of the Jones Act in detail, and 
(2) how the energy market currently deals with the Act. In Part IV, the 
Jones Act’s substantial effects on the U.S. energy market and U.S. energy 
transportation is reviewed in detail. The pros and cons of the Jones Act are 
discussed in relation to all forms of transportation that the Jones Act has 
inadvertently influenced, such as the market for natural resource 
transportation by pipeline, airplane, and railway. Further, this section will 
discuss how the Jones Act hindered development of an independent U.S. 
energy market, explaining how weaknesses of the Jones Act encouraged 
the entry of foreign energy competitors into the domestic market, despite 
the Act’s protectionist scheme. Part V will offer reasonable alternatives as 
to how the Jones Act can be brought up-to-date with the current U.S. 
policy trends, such as relaxing specific provisions of the Act to promote 
easier transport of domestically produced natural resources, or granting of 
a perpetual waiver to foreign maritime transporters operating in the energy 
industry. Finally, Part VI concludes by summarizing key points and 
offering suggestions as to next steps. 
 
20 See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order. No. 13,783, 
82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,093–94 (Mar. 31, 2017) (stating “[t]he heads of agencies shall review all 
existing regulations . . . that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced 
energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources”). 
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I. HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MARITIME CABOTAGE 
LAWS 
 
Maritime cabotage laws are not unique to the United States, as 
nations have historically placed an extremely high value on their domestic 
shipping industries.21 As Thomas Grennes recognized in his economic 
analysis of the Jones Act, “Protection of domestic shipping is an age-old 
mercantilistic practice that came to the American colonies in the form of 
British Navigation Acts,”22 which “date back to the 1600’s” when they 
protected British trading interests against foreign competitors like the 
Dutch.23 Recognizing the importance of protecting a country’s shipping 
industry at the inception of the U.S.’s creation, domestic shipping laws 
were established “in the First Congress of 1789-1791.”24 This law, which 
imposed the first maritime cabotage restriction, was actually a tax law 
entitled “An Act Imposing Duties on Tonnage,” and enforced higher taxes 
on foreign ships that “wished to engage in coastwise business, signaling 
the early American interest in protecting their domestic, port-to-port 
shipping trade from foreign competitors.”25 Taxes were relatively high for 
foreign vessels under this law, as they were charged fifty cents per ton of 
cargo, compared to a “U.S. built and owned vessel,” which was only 
charged six cents per ton of cargo.26 But, this early tax law still lacked 
ability to fully incentivize the use of “American built and owned ships and 
vessels” because it “did not prohibit foreign ships from participating in 
coastwise trades along the waters of the United States.”27 Thus, because 
seafaring transport was the preeminent mode of travel and trade in the 18th 
and 19th century,28 the newly-formed American government continued to 
maintain emphasis on strengthening its U.S. maritime industry, seeking 
 
21 See Lisa Houssiere, The Jones Act and export of crude oil and LNG from the USA, 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT ¶ 2 (Mar. 2016), 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/137945/the-jones-act-and-export-of-
crude-oil-and-lng-from-the-usa (explaining that most countries place restrictions on their coastwise 
trade). 
22 Grennes, supra note 18, at 4. 
23 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2. 
24 Grennes, supra note 18, at 4. 
25 Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 613 (citing Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 27 (repealed 
1790)). 
26 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2. 
27 Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 614–15. 
28 KENNETH D. FREDERICK & ROGER A. SEDJO, AMERICA’S RENEWABLE RESOURCES: 
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 28–30 (2011).  
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stronger maritime cabotage laws that would force American industries to 
use American-made and American-staffed ships.29  
 
A. Original U.S. Maritime Cabotage Restrictions 
 
 These original maritime cabotage restrictions put in place by the 
First Congress’s tax law were soon followed by “An Act concerning the 
navigation of the United States” (the Navigation Act of 1817), which is 
“regarded as the direct predecessor to the Jones Act.”30 This Act was the 
first true maritime cabotage restriction in U.S. law, outright “barr[ing] 
foreign vessels from domestic commerce,” and completely banning them 
from any coastal trade between U.S. ports.31 After imposing this complete 
ban on foreign competitors in port-to-port trade, the American maritime 
shipping industry grew significantly and eventually “dominate[d] 
domestic shipping,” successfully ousting foreign competitors.32 But, 
growth in domestic shipping was not because U.S. ships were superior in 
quality; rather, success of the U.S.’s shipping industry was possible 
because of the protectionist nature of the Navigation Act,33 as the Act 
specifically required that any and all domestic trade done by maritime 
transportation be on U.S.-flagged vessels.34 Moving into the 20th century, 
even prior to the ultra-protectionist Jones Act, the U.S.’s policy on 
domestic shipping was still considered to be “the most restrictive, 
protectionist shipping policies in the world.”35 
The U.S. maritime industry operated under the Navigation Act up 
until and all the way though World War I (WWI), which brought to light 
some of the inherent issues regarding the quality of the U.S. domestic 
shipping fleet. Although the domestic coastal fleet had grown 
substantially, it consisted almost entirely of outdated, wooden vessels.36 
During WWI, steel had replaced wood as the primary shipbuilding 
 
29 Id. 
30 Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 98 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 31, § 4, 3 Stat. 
351). 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MARITIME ADMINISTRATION POLICY PAPER ON U.S. 
CABOTAGE LAWS, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/ 
docs/resources/newsroom/fact-sheets/3626/cabotagelaws.pdf ¶ 1–2 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2017); see also Stephen Mihm, Editorial: Why the U.S. Embraced the Jones Act a Century Ago, 
BLOOMBERG ¶ 8 (Oct. 16, 2017), http://gcaptain.com/why-the-us-embraced-the-jones-act-a-century-
ago/.  
32 See Mihm, supra note 31, at ¶ 13 (noting that “the American domination of domestic 
shipping rested on protectionism, not any real competitive advantage.”). 
33 See id. at ¶ 12. 
34 RUSS KASHIAN, ET. AL., PERSPECTIVE: A SURVEY OF THE COSTS AND EFFECTS OF THE 
1920 MERCHANT MARINE ACT 4 (eds. Keli’i Akina, Malia Blom Hill & Joe Kent, 2017). 
35 Mihm, supra note 31, at ¶ 13. 
36 Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 102; Mihm, supra note 31, at ¶ 14. 
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material, but U.S. shipyards could not afford to use it because of the high 
price and protectionist tariffs insulating the domestic steel industry (alas, 
the U.S. loves its protectionist laws).37 Further, the U.S. fleet responsible 
for international shipping was roughly “a tenth of the size” of that 
responsible for domestic shipping and primarily dependent on foreign-
flagged ships.38 After the U.S.’s domestic shipping fleet was decimated in 
aiding war efforts, the low-quality of their merchant marine was suddenly 
revealed. Coastwise shipping became “prohibitively expensive” and 
maritime shipping laws had to be relaxed in an attempt to restructure and 
revitalize the shipping industry.39 Only then did the U.S. government 
finally allow foreign vessels to participate in coastwise shipping to offset 
costs and rebuild their domestic fleet. This included multiple policies, 
including the Panama Act of 1912, the Shipping Act of 1916, and the 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which combined allowed the 
government to acquire young (less than five years old), foreign-built ships 
that were brought in to supplement the waning U.S. merchant marine 
fleet.40 
With the weaknesses of the U.S. domestic merchant marine 
exposed by WWI, “the country realized that it needed to do more in order 
to have the merchant marine available in case of war.”41 Thus, the Jones 
Act was established with that purpose in mind,42 and with little debate in 
its passage, the Act became “the cornerstone of any future American 
maritime policy.”43 Although the Jones Act was essentially a 
“continuation” of the aforementioned cabotage laws that had been 
continually passed since the First Congress,44 the Jones Act still 
 
37 See Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 615. 
38 Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 102. 
39 See Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 615–16.  
40 The restrictions on each acquired foreign ship were dependent on which one of these 
Acts it was acquired under. Id. at 616. 
41 Id. 
42 See 46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (explaining that the purpose of the Jones Act is to ensure that 
a strong domestic merchant marine exists for national security interest’s promotion of growth in 
international and domestic commerce). 
43 Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 105 (further noting that because the final version 
of the Jones Act was essentially the same in the House and the Senate at time of passage there is little 
legislative history on it, so more key in the Act is “the statutory language itself”). 
44 In an address to Congress regarding a proposed amendment to repeal the Jones Act with 
the passage of a bill to approve the Keystone XL Pipeline Act, Senator McCain stated: “As many of 
you know, the Jones Act is simply a continuation of laws passed through U.S. history addressing 
cabotage-or port-to-port coastal shipping. Those laws have been used to protect U.S. domestic 
shipping dating back to the very first session of Congress.” 161 Cong. Rec. S372-02 (Statement of 
Sen. McCain). 
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“represents some of the most restrictive cabotage policies among 
industrialized nations and in the world.”45  
Since its passage, the Jones Act has required that to participate in 
U.S. coastwise transport (of merchandise), a vessel: 
may not provide any part of the transportation of merchandise by 
water, or by land and water, between points in the United States to which 
the coastwise laws apply, either directly or via a foreign port, unless the 
vessel—(1) is wholly owned by citizens of the  United States for 
purposes of engaging in the coastwise trade; and (2) has been issued a 
certificate of documentation with a coastwise endorsement . . . or is exempt 
from documentation but would otherwise but would otherwise be eligible 
for such a certificate and endorsement.46 
 
Although this language is already extremely restrictive of foreign 
competition, the especially stringent requirements of the Jones Act are 
exposed by looking at the details of its statutory language. For example, 
“coastwise” regulations include all U.S. territories and possessions, which 
includes Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.47 This alone has created a plethora of issues regarding distribution 
of costs imposed by the Act, which are discussed in detail in Parts III and 
IV.48 Further, obtaining a “coastwise endorsement” includes a 
controversial “U.S.-build requirement,” which “requires that [a] vessel 
[involved in domestic trade] be built in the United States except in certain 
circumstances.”49 This build requirement is one-of-a-kind for cabotage 
laws, as it is not seen in any other modes of U.S. transportation, thus 
highlighting the extensive protectionism that the Jones Act promotes.50   
 
B. Post-Passage History of the Jones Act 
 
Since its passage the Jones Act has only become more 
restrictive.51 Notably, after an amendment to the Jones Act in 1956, any 
ship that is now “rebuilt” outside the United States, even if originally built 
within it, will no longer have the right to engage in domestic coastwise 
 
45 KASHIAN, supra note 34, at 5. 
46 46 U.S.C. § 55102(b) (2012). 
47 Id. § 55101(a) (noting that “the coastwise laws apply to the United States, including the 
island territories and possessions of the United States.”). 
48 See infra Part III, Part IV. 
49 46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2012) (Historical and Revision Notes); see also Joseph M. Conley, 
The Jones Act: Its Effects on the U.S. Response to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and its 
Relevance in International Law, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. R. 151, 154 (2012).  
50 See Conley, supra note 49, at 154 (citing Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 122); 
see also Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that “[a]ir cabotage laws [have certain restrictions] . . . but 
there is no requirement that the planes be built in the [U.S.]”). 
51 See Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 106. 
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trade.52 Additionally, other legislation and policy matters that have come 
after the Jones Act have felts its influence, as its widespread restrictions in 
the vital market of maritime shipping are intertwined with other methods 
of transportation.53  
The first piece of legislation worth noting is the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA), which extended U.S. lands to “all 
artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or 
temporarily attached to the seabed.”54 Since this act’s passage, the Jones 
Act now applies to “artificial islands, mobile oil drilling rigs, . . . drilling 
platforms” and the like.55 Thus, after the passage of the OCSLA, only 
Jones Act compliant ships would be able to transport natural resources 
produced from an offshore rig if the resources were being returned to a 
domestic refinery, because the natural resources produced are considered 
“merchandise” under the current meaning of the Act.56  
Just as the Jones Act’s influence on the OCSLA affects cabotage 
and transportation in the U.S. energy market, more “petroleum-related 
cabotage laws were passed in the 1970s” because of the Jones Act.57 The 
first law was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, which 
required that “any exports of [Alaskan] crude oil must be on [Jones Act 
compliant] U.S.-flag tankers.”58 Because of the Jones Act, Alaskan oil had 
to be shipped pursuant to its stringent requirements, and could not be 
exported by cheaper and more convenient foreign vessels.59 Additionally, 
the Competitive Shipping and Shipbuilding Act of 1983 attempted to 
impose a requirement that “[five] percent of imports and exports [of oil] . 
. . be carried by U.S. built and registered vessels.”60 Although this bill 
eventually failed, it represents the concerted effort by Jones Act 
proponents to extend its restrictions into other domestic cabotage laws.  
Despite how far reaching and influential the Jones Act had 
become, it remained relatively un-scrutinized until after World War II, as 
proponents and opponents began to take a harder look at the law’s effects 
on the overall economy.61 The resulting studies on the Jones Act 
 
52 P.L. 714, Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 600, 70 Stat. 544. 
53 Id. 
54 See Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 619 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2016)). 
55 Id. 
56Id.; 46 U.S.C. § 55102(b) (2012). 
57 Robert Bradley, Jr., Cabotage Cronyism: Some History of the Jones Act, 
MASTERRESOURCE.ORG ¶ 9 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.masterresource.org/ 
jones-act-maritime-regulation/history-jones-act/. 
58 H.R. Rep. No. 104–139, pt. 1, at 19; see also Bradley, supra note 57, at ¶ 10. 
59 See Bradley, supra note 57. 
60 Id. at ¶ 10 n.9. 
61 See Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 108. 
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subsequently revealed just how restrictive and protective the law truly was. 
The Act’s influence was not only prevalent in domestic maritime 
transportation but it had subtly permeated into other domestic cabotage 
transportation laws. 
 
 
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE JONES ACT 
 
Due to the Jones Act’s heavily protectionist scheme, different 
groups and people have historically been affected in varying ways and 
degrees. When the Jones Act was passed in 1920, the U.S. had just come 
out of WWI, with national security interests still on the forefront of 
everyone’s mind and maritime shipping still the primary and most broadly 
used method of transportation for both people and merchandise.62 But, 
over the past century, new methods of transportation and changing 
industry processes have vastly shifted the economic landscape. Despite 
these changes, the Jones Act has remained stagnant, which has 
undoubtedly played a significant role in influencing the development of 
other methods of transportation.63 But, whether the role the Jones Act had 
on domestic cabotage laws and transportation has been beneficial or 
detrimental is heavily disputed because “some producers suffer, while 
their rivals benefit.”64 
This Part will explore what the actual ramifications of the Jones 
Act have been on the present-day economy, especially in relation to the 
Act’s intended purposes and the energy transportation market. It will first 
consider whether the Jones Act, in its current state, accomplishes its 
intended purpose and what the overall economic impact has been, 
considering both the benefits and the negatives alleged by proponents and 
opponents of the Act. The analysis will then turn to how the Jones Act has 
affected the U.S. energy market, primarily analyzing how it influences 
domestic “intermodal”65 competition within energy transport. Lastly, it 
will turn to past and ongoing legislative and administrative actions related 
to the Jones Act, looking at the multitude of efforts that have attempted to 
 
62 See Grennes, supra note 18, at 10. But see Frederick & Sedjo, supra note 28, at 28–30 
(explaining that water transportation went into decline in 1840, but the author is referring to “inland” 
water routes as opposed to domestic shipping coastally and internationally). 
63 Nancy Ruth Fox & Lawrence J. White, U.S. Ocean Shipping Policy: Going Against the 
Tide, 553 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75, 83–85 (1997). This author aptly notes that “[t]he 
Jones Act protection of coastal trades, with its consequence of higher shipping rates, has surely caused 
some goods to be shipped over less efficient modes or not to be shipped at all.” Id. at 83. 
64 Id. 
65 Intermodal transportation pertains to “transportation involving more than one form of 
carrier.” Intermodal Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/intermodal 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018). 
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change its strict protectionist requirements in order to open up (or, in some 
instances, further shelter off) the domestic marketplace.  
 
A. The Jones Act’s Mixed Results in Accomplishing its 
Economic Purpose 
 
How and to what degree the Jones Act has impacted the U.S. 
economy has been the subject of heavy dispute,66 as the multiple economic 
reports on the subject have come over a lengthy time span. Admittedly, 
pinpointing exact figures and numbers that can be directly linked back to 
the Jones Act is a difficult task, especially because gathering reference 
points in the short periods when the Jones Act has not been in effect in the 
last century (i.e., when Jones Act waivers have been in effect) provides 
only a limited view into the broad ranging influence it actually retains.67 
Additionally, Jones Act opponents allege that it has had a more significant 
impact on places outside the contiguous United States (e.g., Hawaii, 
Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Guam) because of the additional maritime travel 
that is required to serve those markets and “since a much greater 
proportion of their goods are supplied via ship.”68 Thus, more of the 
research available on the economic impact of the Jones Act revolves 
around these states and territories, which explains why Jones Act scholars 
typically do not take a more holistic approach that considers the United 
States in its entirety. Nonetheless, all Jones Act critics (both supporters 
and opponents) seem to recognize that the protectionist policy is having a 
substantial economic effect in some form or fashion.69 
 
1. The Jones Act’s Successes 
 
 
66 Elizabeth Chuck, What is the Jones Act? Opponents to 1920 Law Argue it’s Worsening 
Puerto Rico’s Crisis, NBC NEWS ¶ 5–7 (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/puerto-rico-crisis/what-jones-act-opponents-1920-law-argue-it-s-worsening-
n805101 (identifying both the supporters and opposition to the Act). But see The Jones Act is Critical 
to the Military Strategy of the United States, Which Relies on the Use of U.S. Flag Ships, AM. MAR. 
PARTNERSHIP, https://www.americanmaritimepartnership.com/u-s-maritime-industry/the-jones-act/, 
¶ 1–5 (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (arguing that the Jones Act “is crucial to our country’s economic 
security”). 
67 See Mark Gius, Regulatory restrictions and energy: The impact of the Jones Act on spot 
gasoline prices, 62 ENERGY POL’Y 1058, 1059 (2013) (analyzing the spot gasoline prices during Jones 
Act waiver periods of the last ten years, which “have all been for petroleum and petroleum-based 
products”). 
68 KASHIAN, supra note 34, at 5 (explaining that the importing and exporting of 
“merchandise” via maritime transportation is more prevalent here because, in most instances, it is the 
only method of transportation these territories have available).  
69 See supra note 63. 
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Turning first to those who support the Jones Act, the proponents 
of the Act continually argue that it has been a resounding success and 
accomplishes its original goals.70 Specifically, they argue that the Jones 
Act allows the U.S. to maintain a strong domestic merchant marine that 
can quickly respond to any “national emergency” (e.g., wartime or natural 
disaster), and has boosted domestic commerce by establishing and 
protecting an American shipping industry by insulating it from foreign 
intervention.71 The Jones Act proponents who have proffered these 
arguments primarily consist of (1) pro-defense groups; (2) maritime 
unions; and (3) U.S. shipyards.72 Collectively, they contend that the Jones 
Act is essential to national defense efforts, job creation, and the U.S. 
shipbuilding industry.73  
In terms of “national emergency,” the ideology of Jones Act 
supporters can be attributed back to “Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 1890 work 
on naval warfare, The Influence of Sea Power upon History.”74 Here, 
Mahan stressed that a strong merchant marine was the key to ensuring a 
strong navy and national defense.75 Jones Act proponents have mostly 
stuck by this mantra, entrenched in their position that the current law is 
“vital to the national security.”76 To counter the opposition’s argument that 
the U.S. has never actually engaged its Jones Act compliant fleet in a 
national emergency, proponents note that what the Jones Act provides is 
the “ability to meet any [national emergency]” with a strong domestic fleet 
at the ready.77  
Less staunch supporters also retain the position that the Jones Act 
currently serves national security interests, but concede that in recent 
history, there is evidence the Act has not been the most proficient in this 
 
70 See Samuel A. Giberga & John Henry Tab Thompson, We and Mr. Jones: How the 
Misunderstood Jones Act Enhances Our Security and Economy, 46 J. MAR. L. & COM., no. 4, 2015, 
at 493, 502–08. It is worth noting that other Jones Act scholars find that “the Jones Act has attracted 
few public defenses,” and when one does surface, it is usually authored by individuals that directly 
benefit from the it. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 6. For example, Samuel A. Giberga, the author of 
the above article, is “the executive office of ‘Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.,’ [which is] the owner 
and operator of one of the largest fleets of Jones Act qualified offshore service vessels.” Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
71 Giberga & Thompson, supra note 70, at 502, 505. 
72 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 5–6; see supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
73 See Frittelli, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
74 Malia Blom Hill, The Sinking Ship of Cabotage: How the Jones Act lets unions and a 
few companies hold the economy hostage, CAP. RES. CTR. 1, 2 (Apr. 7, 2013), 
https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-sinking-ship-of-cabotage-how-the-jones-act-lets-unions-and-a-
few-companies-hold-the-economy-hostage/ (noting that “Jones used Mahan’s writings on national 
defense . . . to justify creating [the Jones Act]”).   
75 Id. 
76 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 5. 
77 See Giberga & Thompson, supra note 70, at 504 (emphasis added); see also Chuck, 
supra note 60, at ¶ 6 (explaining that the Jones Act has received bi-partisan support from past U.S. 
presidents, who “have touted it as crucial to national security because it reduces America’s dependency 
on foreign-owned vessels”). 
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area.78 Supportive congressional research sums up the Act’s deficiency in 
this area to changing dynamics of war, stating that because of “the long 
time needed to build new ships, the relatively brief duration of most recent 
wars, and the expanded inventory of government-owned sealift ships, the 
wartime importance of the shipbuilding industry has declined.”79 
Proponents further contend that the Jones Act’s national security purpose 
remains intact because in the event of a prolonged national emergency, the 
merchant marine developed by the Act still has the ability to provide 
government ships with reinforcements.80 Although this hypothetical 
argument works on paper, the reality is that the Jones Act fleet is 
comprised of commercial vessels, not multi-purpose ones, and these 
vessels lack much of the capabilities that would be necessary to offer 
strategic military support.81 Further, the commercial Jones Act fleet has 
diminished over time, and now contains only about ninety ships.82 More 
national security concerns will be discussed below, but it remains 
relatively clear that the current state of the Jones Act struggles to continue 
serving this purpose. 
The stronger point that proponents make in arguing that the Act 
has historically benefitted the U.S. economy rests in the Act’s second 
stated purpose—that it boosts domestic commerce83—as it is undeniable 
that the Act has created jobs and continues to stand as the backbone to the 
domestic shipping industry.84 Pursuant to the Act’s basic requirements, 
Jones Act vessels must be built in U.S. shipyards, crewed by U.S. citizens, 
and used for all coastwise transport.85 American jobs are created at each 
stage of this process, as they must be, or else there would be no way to 
 
78 Most recently, the Jones Act had to be waived to assist in the wake of Hurricane Maria 
(as it has been for most natural disasters). See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text. To provide 
a war time example, “more than one-fifth of dry cargo” deployed to the military during the Persian 
Gulf conflict was done so using foreign-chartered vessels as opposed to the domestic merchant marine. 
Nicolas Loris, Brian Slattery, & Bryan Riley, Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America’s Competitive 
Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries, HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 1 (May 22, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/sink-the-jones-act-restoring-americas-
competitive-advantage-maritime. 
79 Frittelli, supra note 6 at 3. 
80 Id. 
81 See Grennes, supra note 18, at 32 (stating “[t]he number of large Jones Act commercial 
ships was 193 in 2000, but by 2014 there were only 90”). 
82 See Coleman, supra note 4, at 6. 
83 See 46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (2002). 
84 See Chris Schultz, The Jones Act: Outdated or Vital?, LAW STREET ¶ 3 (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/politics/jones-act-outdated-vital/. See also Chuck, supra note 60, at 
¶ 6 (stating “the law has found backers in the American maritime industry, which says it supports 
American jobs”). 
85 Frittelli, supra note 6. 
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comply with the Act’s strict provisions.86 Proponents further argue that 
“the economic contribution of the Jones Act extends [even] beyond ship 
operations,” as the Jones Act further requires that U.S. ships are built with 
U.S. products, which then creates additional jobs in the industries that 
supply the shipbuilding materials.87  
Whether the Jones Act creates jobs is not in dispute, and 
opponents of the Act recognize that “Jones Act proponents . . . regularly 
claim[] that job creation is a major benefit of the [A]ct.”88 Jones Act 
opponents instead consider the price that we pay to create these jobs. As 
later analysis will discuss, the Jones Act is “poorly tailored” to meet its 
job creation goals.89 The lack of foreign investment makes the Act’s 
shortcomings and inefficiencies in job creation especially acute, as the 
only thing U.S. shipyards are still hired to construct are Jones Act 
compliant ships (because the law requires that these shipyards are used).90 
When further considering that U.S. built ships are rarely ever utilized for 
anything besides U.S. port-to-port travel, justification of the Act’s 
economic viability becomes a progressively more onerous task. 
 
2. The Jones Act’s Failures  
 
Directly contradicting the arguments of the proponents, detractors 
of the Jones Act argue that the law, in its current state, “hinders free trade, 
stifles the economy, and hurts consumers, largely for the benefit of labor 
unions.”91 This statement, made by Arizona Senator John McCain in his 
previous effort to repeal the Jones Act, has been echoed by other studies 
conducted on the economic effects of the Jones Act, one of which states: 
Economic evidence abounds that the Jones Act harms business 
and the U.S. economy. Nearly every independent study of the act’s effects 
finds it creates expensive barriers to trade. In 1995, a report from the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, an independent agency, found the Jones 
Act costs the U.S. economy at least $2.8 billion annually and its removal 
would lower domestic shipping prices by 26% . . . [and] a 2013 report . . . 
describe[s] the Jones Act as the most restrictive of global cabotage laws 
and an anomaly in an otherwise open market like the United States.92 
 
 
86 See The Jones Act, TRANSP. INST., https://transportationinstitute.org/jones-act/ (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
87 Id. 
88 Grennes, supra note 18, at 38. 
89 Coleman, supra note 4, at 6. 
90 See id.  
91 161 CONG. REC. S372-02 (statement of Sen. McCain), supra note 44.  
92 Hill, supra note 74, at 2–3 (internal quotations omitted).  
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In addition to the adverse economic effects, opponents routinely 
raise arguments that the Jones Act is an outdated law that does not, and 
has never, served its intended purpose.93 Although most economic studies 
on the Jones Act note that its costs are dispersed to almost all of American 
consumers, the Act’s most prominent opponents have historically been (1) 
bulk shippers; and (2) consumers in the non-contiguous U.S. territories 
and states.94 
Again considering “national emergency,” as was briefly discussed 
above,95 Jones Act opponents argue that despite the Jones Act’s stated 
purpose, the idea of contributing to military efforts with a domestic 
merchant marine ignores the realities of actual modern-day maritime 
operations.96 It is argued that even if the U.S. wanted to send its merchant 
marine to contribute to U.S. military efforts abroad, it would not be able 
to because of the significantly diminished Jones Act compliant fleet 
capacity.97 Outside of the Jones Act commercial vessels, the rest of the 
fleet is apparently made up of “ferries and tugboats, which would 
contribute little to distant military actions.”98 Further, there have been cited 
instances where military efforts succeed in spite of, rather than because of, 
the Jones Act, which again required waivers to be granted so that foreign 
ships could assist.99 Similarly, as previously mentioned, the Jones Act is 
meant to extend to all “national emergencies,” which include both “natural 
and human-induced [natural] disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, oil 
spills, loss of electrical power, and breaks in oil pipelines.”100 Most 
recently, for Hurricanes Harvey and Maria, Jones Act waivers had to be 
granted (which has become standard practice).101 Rather than offer any 
assistance, the Act rather served to create “unnecessary legal roadblocks” 
when waiver was delayed or refused during these disasters.102 Thus, 
although general “national emergency” assistance was one of the Jones 
Act’s intended purposes, sparse evidence exists to justify keeping the 
Jones Act in its current state to actually assist in these situations, as it 
seems to create more trouble than it helps to alleviate. 
 
93 See, e.g., Slattery et al., supra note 78, at 1–7 (analyzing in-depth why the Jones Act 
hinders national security and is harmful to the U.S. economy).  
94 Frittelli, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
95 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.  
96 Slattery et al., supra note 78, at 1–2  
97 See Grennes, supra note 18, at 32 (noting that the Jones Act commercial fleet has fallen 
from 193 ships in 2000 to just 90 in 2014). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 32. 
100 Id. at 34. 
101 Id. 
102 Slattery et al., supra note 78, at 4. 
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Turning to economic benefits of the Act, opponents offer statistics 
that stand in stark contrast to those on which proponents depend, 
summarily arguing that any positives the Act may bring are far outweighed 
by its negatives. Although originally intended to bolster domestic 
commerce, the Jones Act in today’s environment acts more like a crutch 
by “keep[ing] otherwise uncompetitive elements of the American shipping 
industry afloat . . . [at] a stiff price [to] consumers.”103 The Jones Act, 
recognized as an “unabashedly protectionist” piece of legislation by the 
judiciary,104 specifically acts as a crutch to the U.S. shipping industry, 
because it has been shielded from having to respond to competition for 
over a century and thus has not had motivation to innovate.105 
Consequently, U.S. shipping has become uncompetitive, as U.S.-flag 
bearing ships now account for only 0.4% of the worlds fleet.106 
 Although the definitive net cost is disputed, some numbers given 
by opponents provide evidence that the Jones Act has hindered our 
domestic shipping industry to a point where it may cease to exist if the 
Jones Act were repealed, as the extreme costs imposed by the law would 
dissuade anyone from investing in a U.S. ship if the law did not require 
them to. Multiple studies have found that having a ship built or produced 
in the U.S. costs “four to five times higher” than what it would cost to 
build a ship abroad.107 In addition to increased building costs, the 
“Congressional Research Service has shown that operating costs of 
American vessels bound to the Jones Act can be more than twice as high 
per day to comparable foreign ships.”108 Further, opponents are uniform 
in their agreement that “in far-flung domestic ports like Hawaii, Alaska, 
and Puerto Rico . . . the problem [of the Jones Act] is particularly 
salient.”109 The Jones Act has been cited directly as a major factor in 
 
103 Id. at 1; see Grennes, supra note 18, at 6 (stating that “[n]early all analytical studies of 
the Jones Act have found that it imposes net costs on the U.S. economy). 
104 Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir. 1970). 
105 See J.W. Wall III, Wall: Want to Help Texas? Repeal the Jones Act, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE (February 20, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/ 
outlook/article/Wall-Want-to-help-Texas-Repeal-the-Jones-Act-12628472.php; see also 
Grennes, supra note 18, at 10. 
106 Id. at 11; see also How Protectionism Sank America’s Entire Merchant Fleet, 
ECONOMIST ¶ 1 (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21730034-
jones-act-hurts-american-consumers-and-destroyed-countrys-shipping. 
107 Stevens, supra note 19, at 3, ¶ 5; Grennes, supra note 18, at 21; KASHIAN, supra note 
34, at 14; John Frittelli, Shipping U.S. Crude Oil by Water: Vessel Flag Requirements and Safety 
Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 1, 11 (July 21, 2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43653.pdf.  
108 Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 5 (emphasis added). 
109 Coleman, supra note 4, at 5. Even Jones Act opponents cannot ignore the adverse costs 
that these regions feel because of their distance and lack of transportation options, stating that “[these 
areas] have a relationship with the Jones Act that differs from the continental United States . . . [and] 
have every right to be unhappy with higher prices” that the Act causes. Giberga & Thompson, supra 
note 70, at 507–08.  
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Puerto Rico’s economic woes,110 and various studies have estimated the 
Act’s combined costs in these areas to range between $2.8 billion to $9.8 
billion per year.111 
It seems that the primary point that opponents of the Act hope to 
make is that, although the Jones Act does create jobs and keeps the U.S. 
shipping industry afloat, its costs undoubtedly exceed the benefits that it 
offers. It is indisputable that the Jones Act was not passed or put in place 
to be a “jobs program” that continues to employ “regardless of how little 
[employees] produce or what the ships cost,” and it should thus not be 
justifiable to continue under this purpose.112 Keeping it alive for this 
purpose has not only impeded the U.S. economy in terms of maritime 
transportation, but it has also begun to strangle other parts of the U.S. 
economy, significantly affecting areas that depend on fairly priced, 
reliable transport.113 At the forefront of this is the U.S. energy market, as 
the Jones Act has distorted energy transportation and taken away domestic 
business.114   
 
B. The Jones Act Effect’s on the U.S. Energy Market 
 
As a protectionist domestic transportation law, the Jones Act has 
had its biggest influence (outside of maritime shipping) in the energy 
transportation market, which has become significantly more complex 
since the Jones Act’s passage.115 Because of the “[broad] scope of the 
[domestic energy market’s] supply chain,” the Jones Act’s influence on 
cabotage laws within energy have been amplified, and has ultimately 
influenced everything in domestic energy from production of natural 
resources to how those resources are imported and exported.116 Illustrating 
the depth of the relationship between the two industries, petroleum 
products accounted for, and continue to account for, the “lion’s share” of 
 
110 Editorial, Puerto Rico Needs Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/opinion/puerto-rico-needs-debt-relief.html?_r=0 (directly 
offering relaxation of the Jones Act by lawmakers as a way to pull Puerto Rico out of debt). 
111 See Opinion, Nelson Denis, The Jones Act: The Law Strangling Puerto Rico, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/ 
hurricane-puerto-rico-jones-act.html; see also Coleman, supra note 4, at 5 (estimating 
combined savings to be “as much as $15 billion per year.”). 
112 Grennes, supra note 18, at 38.  
113 See Puerto Rico Needs Debt Relief, supra note 110. 
114 See Wall, supra note 105. 
115 See id. 
116 Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 7; see also Bradley, supra note 57 (exemplifying a time 
when the Jones Act had a direct effect on the cabotage laws of natural gas). 
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Jones Act cargos.117 But, as transportation options have expanded, the 
energy industry has rallied against maritime shipping due to the 
prohibitively expensive price tag the Act carries, which has made it 
extraordinarily difficult for the energy industry to utilize maritime 
transportation.118 As a result, “intermodal competition”119 expanded 
throughout the domestic energy market, and other forms of transportation 
began to burgeon, which finally led to the substitution of shipping and 
maritime transport for more economical methods of transportation.120 
Today, these newer methods of transportation, which include “trucks, 
railroads, airlines, and pipelines,” have become an integral part of the 
domestic natural resource supply chain due to costs of the Jones Act.121  
As an example of the Jones Act’s excessive costs, research 
assessing the domestic premium on natural resource shipments found that 
“shipping oil from Texas to New England costs about $6 per barrel, while 
shipping to Europe costs just $2 per barrel,”122 resulting in total costs of 
“more than $158 million every year” for the petroleum industry.123 Thus, 
as alternative forms of transportation have become available, natural 
resource producers have jumped on the opportunity to utilize them in an 
effort to save both themselves and consumers from facing the adverse 
impact and significant price hikes of the Jones Act. But, despite the 
increasingly popular alternative forms of transportation, the Jones Act 
could not be fully ignored by the energy industry for long.  
The first issues were realized in assessing the energy markets for 
the non-contiguous U.S. states and territories,124 as it quickly became 
apparent that without the option to utilize these new methods of natural 
resource transport, U.S. states and territories separated by ocean would 
have to continue to rely on the “maritime energy commerce” that the forty-
eight contiguous U.S. states had the luxury of avoiding.125 Because the 
U.S. has refused to change or amend the Jones Act for its non-contiguous 
 
117 Giberga & Thompson, supra note 70, at 504; see also JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., REVITALIZING COASTAL SHIPPING FOR DOMESTIC COMMERCE 1, 2 (May 2, 2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44831.pdf (noting that “oceangoing barges [in the U.S.] mainly carry 
petroleum products.”). 
118 Id. 
119 See supra note 63. 
120 Grennes, supra note 18, at 19–20. 
121 See id. 
122 KASHIAN, supra note 34, at 13; Wall, supra note 105 (stating that “[t]o ship Texas crude 
to Europe or Asia, it’s only $2 per barrel; [but] it costs $7 per barrel to ship to Philadelphia.”). 
123 Keli’i Akina, How the Jones Act Drives up the Price of Food and Gasoline for Millions 
of Americans, THE HILL (Apr. 10, 2017, 7:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/international/328025-how-the-jones-act-drives-up-the-cost-of-food-and-gasoline. 
124 KASHIAN, ET. AL., supra note 34. 
125 Loris, Slattery, & Riley, supra note 78, at 8–9. 
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states and territories, it has created a distortion in energy markets that “has 
a larger negative effect on [these] noncontiguous states and regions.”126  
A second, more recent issue in the modern energy market arose 
with the “shale revolution,”127 which has made the United States one of 
the biggest producers of domestic crude oil in the world since 1995.128 The 
shale revolution, made possible by “[d]irectional drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing” (or “fracking”), has “transformed oil markets by dramatically 
increasing U.S. production of oil and gas from shale.”129 But, the U.S.’s 
sudden increase in domestically produced oil has also reinvigorated the 
need to invoke maritime shipping because “the existing pipeline network 
is not designed to access the new sources of domestic crude.”130 Due to the 
lack of accessible transportation because of the Jones Act making it 
prohibitively expensive to ship within the U.S, the producers seeking to 
capitalize on this shale boom have been unable to capitalize in the 
domestic energy market.131 Instead, both producers and refineries have 
turned to foreign markets.132 This makes the ineffectiveness of the law 
blatant because preventing these “absurd situations,” like the current one 
the energy industry finds themselves in (where it is cheaper to refine crude 
oil abroad than in the U.S.) is exactly what the protectionist Jones Act was 
created to do.133 As a protectionist law that no longer protects domestic 
commerce, it is now time to relax or repeal the Jones Act so that growth 
in the domestic energy market can be promoted rather than prevented. 
 
III. THE JONES ACT’S DAMAGE TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Just as the Jones Act has not served its intended purpose in 
domestic shipping, it has also adversely affected cabotage laws in other 
industries, therefore, not serving its broader purpose in promoting and 
protecting domestic commerce. Because the antiquated Jones Act has 
 
126 Grennes, supra note 18, at 19; Loris, Slattery, & Riley, supra note 78, at 1–2. 
127 Grennes, supra note 18, at 29 (explaining that “the shale revolution has reduced US 
crude oil imports and increased the importance of domestic trade that is subject to the Jones Act.”); 
see Coleman, supra note 4, at 3. 
128 Loris, Slattery, & Riley, supra note 78, at 8–9. 
129 Coleman, supra note 4, at 3. 
130 Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 6. 
131 See Grennes, supra note 18, at 19–20. 
132 Id. 
133 HILL, supra note 74, at 3 (providing another example of an “absurd situation” that the 
Jones Act forced, involving a lumber supplier being forced to truck wood from Maine to Florida in 
order to get it to Puerto Rico because, Maine had no Jones Act compliant ships available to ship the 
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outlived the purpose it was originally intended to serve, its lasting 
protectionism has begun to seep into additional U.S. policy hurting both 
consumers and other industries vital to the success of the country.134 
 
 
 
A. The Domestic Energy Market Continues to Suffer at the 
Hands of the Jones Act 
 
The Jones Act has inadvertently hindered the growth of the 
domestic energy market.135 For example, it has imposed major costs on the 
energy industry,136 which in turn has been passed on to consumers. Senator 
McCain recognized as much in a recent effort to repeal the Jones Act via 
an amendment to Keystone XL Pipeline Act,137 stating: 
There is no doubt that these inflated costs [in domestic maritime 
shipping] are eventually passed on to shipping customers. In the energy 
sector, for example, the price for moving crude oil from the gulf coast 
[where it is produced] to the Northeastern United States [to refine the oil] 
on Jones Act tankers is $5 to $6 more per barrel, while moving it to eastern 
Canada on foreign flag tankers is about $2 . . . [which could] mean an 
additional $1 million per tanker in shipping costs for oil producers. This 
increased cost is why . . . more than twice as much gulf coast crude oil was 
shipped by water to Canada as shipped to Northeastern U.S. refineries . . . 
in an effort to avoid paying Jones Act shipping rates.138 
 
This statement makes blatantly clear the adverse effect the Jones 
Act has had, not only on the domestic energy market, but on all U.S. 
industries that have an invariable dependence on transport in moving their 
merchandise. 
Continuing to allow the Jones Act to have these absurd effects on 
energy transportation is directly contrary to the policy the Trump 
administration set forth this past March. In an Executive Order entitled 
“Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,” the President 
and the executive branch clearly stated that any and all existing regulations 
and policies “that potentially burden the development or use of 
 
134 The Jones Act Has Outlived Its Reason for Existing, AM. J. OF TRANSP. ¶ 11 (Dec. 14, 
2017), https://www.ajot.com/news/the-jones-act-has-outlived-its-reason-for-existing-editorial 
(arguing “[r]arely has a law that costs so much and achieves so little survived [for] so long”).  
135 See Mark J. Perry, U.S. Energy Boom Depends on Team Trump Continuing to 
Deregulate, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY ¶ 1–5 (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.investors.com/ 
politics/commentary/u-s-energy-boom-depends-on-team-trump-continuing-to-
deregulate/.  
136 See Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 6–7. 
137 This bill sought to approve construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline. 
138 Statement of Sen. McCain, supra note 44. 
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domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, 
natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources” shall be reviewed in 
detail.139 The Jones Act is preventing the U.S. from fully taking advantage 
of the shale boom taking place domestically,140  and, therefore, is hindering 
domestic energy independence and economic growth, which is directly 
contrary to the Administration’s publicly stated policy.141 
The Jones Act continues to hinder the energy market in the exact 
way Senator McCain describes,142 preventing transport from the gulf 
coast, where the oil is produced, to the northeast, where the oil can be 
refined.143 Despite the northeast having a fully capable crude oil refinery—
in need of the oil being produced domestically144—the Jones Act 
effectively prevents unrefined petroleum products from getting there on a 
domestic port-to-port route.145 This directly causes a hindrance to growth 
in the U.S. energy market in multiple ways, which illustrates how 
significant and influential the Jones Act is in the transportation of natural 
resources as a whole. 
 
1. Costs Imposed by the Jones Act Discriminate Against Domestic 
Maritime Transport of Crude Oil to U.S. Refineries 
 
First and foremost, the prohibitive cost of the Jones Act itself has 
become a barrier to the efficient transport of shale oil, especially if 
shipping domestically from the south of the U.S. (i.e., Texas) to the east 
coast of the U.S. (i.e., Massachusetts and Pennsylvania).146 It is estimated 
that “it now costs three times as much to ship oil from Texas to refineries 
on the U.S. East Coast as it costs to ship oil [from Texas to] Canada.”147 
This significantly higher price point is a direct result of the stringent 
requirements of the Jones Act, which has led to a smaller fleet of Jones 
 
139 Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, supra note 20, at 16093, Sec. 
2(a). 
140 See Grennes, supra note 18. 
141 See The Jones Act Has Outlived Its Reason for Existing, supra note 134; see also Mark 
Green, An Energy-Embracing Executive Order, ENERGY TOMORROW ¶ 8 (Mar. 28, 2017), 
http://energytomorrow.org/blog/2017/03/28/an-energy-embracing-executive-order. 
142 See Hill, supra note 74, at 3. 
143 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF REDUCTIONS IN REFINERY 
ACTIVITY ON NORTHEAST PETROLEUM PRODUCT MARKETS 4–5 (2012); see also Wall, supra note 
105, at ¶4–7 (explaining that the Jones Act is makes it more economical for Boston to buy its liquefied 
natural gas from Russia instead of Texas). 
144 Id.; Frittelli, supra note 107.  
145 Grennes, supra note 18, at 4–6. 
146 Coleman supra note 4, at 13. 
147 Id.; see Frittelli, supra note 107 (which notes that the specific price point for shipping 
oil from Texas to New England is $6 per barrel). 
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Act compliant ships that cost significantly more to build and operate.148 
As a result, both northeastern refineries and Texas producers turn to 
foreign markets.149 The inherent absurdity illustrated here (i.e., domestic 
shipping costing three times more than international shipping) presents an 
egregious example of how the Jones Act directly discriminates against the 
domestic energy market. 
 
2. The Jones Act has Corrupted U.S. Energy Transportation 
 
The first way the Jones Act impacts domestic energy directly 
effects the second, as its prohibitively expensive domestic shipping prices 
caused a destructive chain reaction to energy transportation as a whole. 
Due to the high prices imposed by the Jones Act, producers have 
historically sought out alternative ways to transport natural resources, 
which has led to the growth of other methods of transportation (such as 
transport by rail, truck, air, or most prominently in the U.S., pipeline).150 
But transportation is all interrelated, and because the Jones Act almost 
completely cuts off the economical use of maritime transportation, these 
other methods have become overburdened and overused.151 The end result 
has been a drastic increase in price to use these alternative methods,152 and 
“concerns about transportation safety and potential impacts to the 
environment.”153 The Jones Act’s restrictive measures on transport have 
now “[had] a profound impact on where crude oil is sourced and how it is 
transported.”154 The energy industry must not only comply with these 
inflated prices to use transportation alternatives—costs that consumers 
ultimately bear—but also utilize transport modes not typically suited to 
moving more refined natural resources.155  
Focusing on the alternative transportation forms that the Jones Act 
adversely affected by making maritime transportation generally 
unavailable for domestically shipping natural resources, the energy market 
has turned to using pipelines and rail significantly more. Unfortunately, 
with pipeline development, “the existing pipeline network is not designed 
 
148 Anna Louie Sussman, Refiners seek Jones Act workarounds as crude export debate 
heats up, REUTERS ¶ 1–7 (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-shipping-
jones/refiners-seek-jones-act-workarounds-as-crude-export-debate-heats-up-
idUSKBN0GK0BT20140820 (noting that in 2014, “U.S. flag vessels cost about $21,000 per day to 
operate, or three times as much as a comparable foreign-flag ship.”). 
149 Wall, supra note 105, at ¶ 4–7. 
150 Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 6–7. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 John Frittelli et. al., U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and Issues for 
Congress, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1 (Dec. 4, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf. 
154 Grennes, supra note 18, at 29 (internal citations omitted). 
155 See id. at 29–30.  
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to access the new source of domestic crude,” again making alternative 
forms more expensive.156 Moreover, extensive use of pipelines over the 
years has led to “strong opposition to the construction of new pipelines,” 
further inhibiting the overall energy supply chain.157 Additionally, overuse 
of rail shipments has caused strong opposition and increased pollution, an 
abuse that has also furthered the importance (and price) of maritime 
shipping, which the Act continually stands to prevent.158 Thus, the Jones 
Act has corrupted and continues to corrupt the entire transportation pattern 
of the U.S. energy trade.  
 
3. The Jones Act’s Prevention of Domestic Transportation of LNG 
 
 Lastly, it is worth noting that the Jones Act can also be fully, not 
just merely, preventative, as the outdated fleet of Jones Act-compliant 
ships cannot transfer certain natural resources.159 The most prevalent 
example, in relation to the non-contiguous U.S., is that no possible way 
exists to transfer Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) domestically because 
currently no Jones Act-compliant ship can carry or transport it.160 Even 
more concerning is the general thought that no one could build an LNG 
Jones Act compliant tanker under the current law because nothing could 
rationalize its price since it would only run U.S. domestic routes.161 
Considering LNG tankers cost billions to build, one used purely for 
domestic routes would never be economical or competitive in the 
international marketplace.162 Further, even if one could finance the tanker, 
no U.S. ports currently have dock space available to support its 
construction.163 This exemplifies the Jones Act’s restriction of 
transportation without offering any viable solutions, aptly illustrating the 
unchecked power the Act has on a key U.S. market.  
Analyzing these issues ultimately shows a growing trend of the 
Jones Act’s outdated maritime restrictions to play a significantly greater 
role in the energy market’s development, adversely affecting the market’s 
development as it grows while the restrictions remain stagnant. 
 
156 Stevens, supra note 19. 
157 Id. (referring to the Keystone XL Pipeline and the Dakota Extension). 
158 See Frittelli, supra note 155, at 25. 
159 Coleman, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
160 See Grennes, supra note 18, at 30; Coleman, supra note 4, at 5. 
161 See Coleman, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
162 See id. at 5. 
163 See Greg LaRose, Report chills idea to link LNG exports to U.S.-built ships, NOLA (Dec. 
14, 2015, 12:56 PM), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2015/12/ 
report_chills_idea_to_link_lng.html (stating that although two U.S. shipyards might have 
docks large enough to support LNG construction, that space is occupied through the end of 2018). 
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B. The Jones Act Imposes Major Costs that are Injurious to 
Consumers 
 
The costs the Jones Act imposes on the energy market are 
eventually passed back to the consumer—another reason this Act 
desperately needs re-evaluation. The Act’s defenders are historically well-
organized, as its alleged benefits concentrate into this small group of 
supporters, while opponents’ losses reach the entire domestic 
population.164 However, the Jones Act should not remain just to protect 
this small group that the law actually benefits, while all consumers suffer, 
especially those in the non-contiguous U.S.165  
 
1. Inequitable Distribution of Jones Act Costs to the Non-
Contiguous U.S. 
 
Consumers in the non-contiguous areas of the U.S. predominantly 
bear the immediate costs of the Jones Act, rather than the dispersed effect, 
because they have no choice but to use maritime transport to import natural 
resources.166 For example, because of the Jones Act, Puerto Rico “pays as 
much as 30[%] more for [LNG than the contiguous U.S. states],” affecting 
consumers’ electricity prices, while Hawaiians must pay significantly 
more for oil, as “75[%] of its electricity [comes] from petroleum,” which 
is all delivered by expensive Jones Act ships.167 Because Hawaii is “the 
most petroleum-dependent state in the United States,”168 not only do the 
Jones Act’s increased prices most significantly impact Hawaiian 
consumers when importing resources,169 but also Hawaiian consumers 
would reap the most significant benefits from relaxing the Act’s 
requirements, as Hawaiians currently have “the highest cost of living and 
the highest energy prices in the Union.”170 In Puerto Rico, researchers 
estimated that gas prices “[are] inflated by at least 15 cents per gallon due 
to the additional transportation costs.”171 As a result, the Jones Act costs 
 
164 See Grennes, supra note 18, at 31. 
165 See id. 
166 ALL. FOR INNOVATION & INFRASTRUCTURE, THE JONES ACT: PROTECTIONISM V 
GLOBAL TRADE 5–6 (2016).  
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169 Brigham A. McCown, Keeping Up With the Jones Act: Inconsistent Trade Policy 
Hinders Economic Growth, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
brighammccown/2016/01/19/keeping-up-with-the-jones-act-inconsistent-trade-policy-
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Puerto Rico “approximately $537 million” in losses annually.172 The 
federal government has even recognized how “detrimental” the Act is to 
Puerto Rico, having formerly recommended that Puerto Rico be granted 
“a temporary exemption . . . to alleviate the pressures from shipping costs 
. . . .”173 Thus, especially in these areas, consumers must suffer an 
inequitable share of the Jones Act’s costs. Yet, the government is still 
reluctant to grant these areas waivers, despite its own findings that the law 
remains especially injurious to consumers in these areas.174 
 
2. A Collective Net Loss for the Average Consumer  
 
Beyond these states and territories that front most of the costs, the 
Jones Act significantly impacts the average consumer. Most prominently, 
“[t]he U.S. International Trade Commission found that in 1996, the Jones 
Act cost the U.S. economy an estimated $1.3 billion [and a] subsequent 
study revealed . . . a $656 million annual positive welfare effect . . . if the 
law were repealed.”175 Although dispersed, these are still significant 
industry costs that are being passed to the consumers, and shedding them, 
or lessening them even slightly, would be beneficial to all. These 
substantial net losses to consumers simply do not outweigh the purported 
benefits of the Jones Act, as additional studies have revealed that “for each 
dollar gained by the protected parties [under the Jones Act], American 
consumers of the transported products lose more than a dollar.”176 Thus, 
this protectionism put in place by the Jones Act has been a “collective net 
loss for Americans” in every respect (except the small domestic shipping 
industry it was designed to protect), and the wider the act spreads across 
other industries, the larger the losses become to consumers.177 
In sum, the Jones Act’s overtly negative affect on the U.S. 
economy represents how removed from its original purpose the law truly 
is. In the following section, solutions are offered as to how the U.S. can 
start to rectify the injuries that the Jones Act has caused to both consumers 
and domestic commerce overall. 
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IV. THE JONES ACT SHOULD BE RELAXED IN PART 
OR REPEALED IN FULL 
 
Turning back to the larger focus of the Jones Act, outside of the 
energy market specifically, the damages caused by the Jones Act could 
begin to be rectified either by partial relaxation or full repeal. But, 
considering how far removed it is from the purpose it was enacted to 
accomplish, it is clear that the law needs some substantial changes to be 
brought up to date with the modern economy. If the Jones Act is allowed 
to remain as is, it is highly likely that other industries cabotage laws will 
be adversely affected by its overly protectionist requirements, as the 
energy market inadvertently was.  
The U.S. should still retain some form of maritime cabotage laws, 
as “there’s no faulting [the Act’s] professed goal.”178 The issue with the 
Jones Act is purely the way it went about accomplishing its goals. America 
is a historically open-market economy that invites competition to spur 
innovation and investment in our marketplace. Thus, the Jones Act is out 
of touch and out of place with our current laws. The key to reframing the 
U.S. cabotage laws is to find a solution that protects U.S. shipping, but not 
to the detriment of the industry, as the current maritime laws have done.179 
There are a number of ways that this law could be re-worked to 
remove some of its overtly protectionist measures, which would allow 
foreign vessels to enter the marketplace without injuring the strength of 
America’s own merchant marine fleet. First and foremost, it is crucial that 
the non-contiguous states be allowed to employ foreign vessels to save on 
costs when reasonable (especially in the energy market).180 This should be 
the first priority because this is where the largest rift exists in which 
consumers front the cost of the Jones Act.181  
Another key change to the Jones Act, which would likely be the 
easiest way to defray some of the immense costs it has created, would be 
to rid the Act of its “U.S.-built” provision,182 as this is one of the more 
controversial areas of the law, and unnecessarily unique to maritime 
cabotage (meaning that no other form of transportation in the U.S. requires 
that all of the materials must be American made).183 This provision is 
already somewhat seen as an “exaggeration” of sorts, because it is difficult 
 
178 Maritime Commerce Can Thrive Without the Jones Act, BLOOMBERG ¶ 1 (Dec. 22, 
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to track whether every piece of material used was made in America, and 
what is actually important is that the ship is “American-built” as opposed 
to having all American made parts.184  
Short of full repeal, one final, non-controversial change to the 
Jones Act could be the more lenient granting of waivers. Currently, 
waivers are only granted either “in the ‘interest of national defense,’” or 
sometimes if “no qualified U.S.-flagged vessels are available to meet the 
need.”185 But, this standard is historically hard to meet. A simple solution 
would be to begin granting waivers for economic hardship as opposed to 
just national emergency. This could then be applied in a broader range of 
situations, and could help to deal with ongoing situations that are not quite 
at the national emergency level. Thus, waivers would become more 
discretionary upon DHS’s judgment, and the Jones Act would 
automatically be a more flexible law that could account for the ever-
changing economic marketplace of the U.S. 
If all else fails, full repeal is still an option. Although Jones Act 
repeal efforts have failed in the past because of staunch lobby oppositions 
from the shipping industry,186 it does not mean they will necessarily fail 
moving forward, especially with this new administration’s determination 
to rid the government of unnecessary regulation. If the current Executive 
were more closely following the plan set forth by their own Executive 
Order,187 the Jones Act should have been one of the first pieces of 
legislation to be targeted. As has been noted by opponents of the Jones 
Act, if “the administration [pushed] to repeal the Jones Act—or, at the very 
least . . . make it less restrictive” billions could collectively be saved on 
shipping.188 This would then make other forms of transportation more 
affordable, as transportation costs across the board would decrease in price 
with more options available,189 and although dispersed, savings would 
then be felt by consumers across the U.S. Thus, anything from repeal to 
menial reform of the Jones Act would be in the best interest of the 
government, domestic commerce, and consumers alike. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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Although the Jones Act was enacted to promote domestic 
commerce, it is now nothing more than a crutch for the U.S. shipping 
industry and a drain on the rest of the economy. Simply put, the Jones Act 
has outlived its purpose, and as a century old law, it desperately needs to 
be brought up to modern times. As one critic stated, “[t]he world is much 
different than it was almost 100 years ago, when the Jones Act was passed 
[and] [t]echnology, innovation and the speed of transportation have vastly 
improved.”190 Yet, the Jones Act has never been adjusted to account for 
these significant changes, and its protectionist measures have been 
allowed to remain since its inception. As a result, its overly restrictive 
provisions on domestic, port-to-port maritime transport have stretched into 
other markets, affecting industries where transportation is a crucial part of 
the supply chain.  
Taking a critical look at the Jones Act, this article discussed how, 
in particular, the Act strangles the energy market. It revealed that because 
of the Jones Act, natural resource transportation has been pinched in a 
multitude of areas, and because foreign competitors have been completely 
banned from domestic shipping, competition has been stifled, causing U.S. 
seafaring vessels to fall behind in both quantity and quality. Further, it 
discussed how in some areas (like LNG), Jones Act compliant vessels do 
not even exist, which has forced transportation through other, riskier 
means. Or, in the instance of the non-contiguous U.S., forced states and 
territories to turn to foreign markets, thus highlighting how the Act’s 
discriminatory pressure on the energy market discriminates against growth 
in domestic commerce. Finally, this article proposed that, outside of full 
repeal, it would be beneficial to all parties involved to at least relax Jones 
Act regulations in the energy market, which would help to promote the 
current Executive trend towards deregulation and the growth of an 
independent energy market.191 
Without relaxation or repeal of the Jones Act, growth in the energy 
market will remain stagnant, and our shipping industry will continue to 
lag. Further, because the Jones Act continues to discourage foreign 
investment, the Jones Act tankers becoming increasingly dated, less 
reliable, and less available every day. Moreover, without some sort of 
change in the law to account for a dynamic marketplace, prices to use 
Jones Act ships will only increase, a cost which will be forced back on 
unsuspecting consumers through energy prices.192 These expansive 
detriments the Jones Act creates can no longer be ignored, and “as the U.S. 
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emerges on the international energy market, inconsistent polices such as 
the Jones Act should be reconsidered.”193 
In order to prevent repercussions of the Jones Act from spreading 
further or influencing other areas of domestic law in other parts of the 
economy, it is imperative that the Jones Act be reevaluated in full, as 
recommended above, to assess how it functions and affects the broader 
scheme of domestic cabotage and transportation law. Outside of 
continuing to review its economic impact, which has been studied in 
significant detail,194 the pertinent next step is to thoroughly review the 
Jones Act’s interplay with other areas of U.S. law. Understanding the full 
extent of the Jones Act’s influence on domestic cabotage law and 
transportation patterns would at least provide an opportunity for the 
legislature to revisit the antiquated law with a hard look, which would 
likely show that repeal or revision could provide the U.S. energy market 
with a much needed “economic shot in the arm.”195 
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